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This paper analyses the effects of commodity price shocks in a new Keynesian model. The 
focus is on the central bank’s choice of inflation target and the degree of real wage rigidity. It 
turns out that using core inflation rather than headline inflation is the superior strategy. 
Targeting expected headline inflation, as practiced by most central banks, is a viable practical 
alternative to the core inflation target. Simulations illustrate these points. The introduction of 
real wage rigidity into the model does not change these conclusions. Real wage rigidity does, 
however, imply second-round effects, making the monetary policy response, the inflation 
peak and the output drop more pronounced.  Although in practice many of the assumptions of 
the model, such as full information, do not hold, lessons can be drawn for monetary policy. 
Faced with a commodity price shock, central banks would do well to focus on some measure 
of core inflation rather than headline inflation so as to reduce the volatility of both inflation 
and output. A communication strategy that places greater emphasis on underlying and 
expected inflation could serve to anchor inflation expectations. I Introduction 
How should central banks react to supply shocks? Given the drastic increases in the price of 
oil and other raw materials in the recent past, this is one of the key issues currently faced by 
central banks. In this paper, we explore what new Keynesian theory has to say about 
commodity price shocks and monetary policy. We focus on two key issues: real wage rigidity 
and the inflation indicator used by the central bank. In the first section we outline the effects 
of a negative supply shock in the medium and long run. We then discuss what happens in the 
short run given different assumptions about wage rigidity and the monetary policy strategy. 
Using a DSGE model we offer several simulation results. Section 3 draws lessons from 
section 2 about whether the central bank should target headline inflation, core inflation or 
expected inflation. The conclusion in section 4 applies the findings of the previous section to 
the current situation in the euro area. 
2 Effects of commodity shocks in and beyond the medium 
term 
Starting point is a standard new-Keynesian model of an oil-importing country that uses oil 
both as a consumer good and as an input in production (Blanchard/Gali 2008).
1 A sharp 
permanent increase in the price of oil means that less of this factor will be employed in 
production. Furthermore, either real wages, employment or the mark-up have to decline. 
Unless there is a contemporaneous downward shift in the labor supply curve, the potential 
output of the economy will decline. 
With oil more expensive and real wages lower, the return on capital increases. In the 
longer run, capital is therefore substituted for oil as investment in energy-efficient equipment 
and new energy technologies increases (Atkeson/Kehoe 1999). As a result, labor productivity 
increases, resulting in either higher real wages or higher employment or a bit of both – in 
either case, potential output once again reaches a higher level. Whether this potential output 
level is higher or lower than the one that would have been realized in the absence of an oil 
price shock depends, among other things, on the technological progress embedded in new 
production methods. 
In the short run, there are frictions in the economy. How monetary policy reacts to the 
supply shock therefore affects how smoothly, and ultimately how fast, the economy reaches 
its new equilibrium.
2
                                                 
1 See Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003) for a detailed exposition of the standard new Keynesian model. 
2 The discussion here abstracts from potential long-term effects of monetary policy.  
  23 Monetary policy, rigidities and commodity shocks 
The “current best practice in monetary policy” is inflation targeting (Svensson 2008: 
2). The term inflation targeting should be understood as inflation-forecast targeting 
(Svensson) or in the words of Bernanke (2004) as “forecast-based policy”. Because of the 
lags with which the economy reacts to monetary-policy actions, central banks have to make 
use of forecasts.
3 New Keynesian models (NKMs), however, often implement a Taylor rule. 
We therefore analyze the effects of both types of monetary policy strategies given different 
assumptions about real wage rigidity.
4  
A simple NK model  
We begin with a model with no real wage rigidity. Nominal frictions that characterize NKMs 
are assumed to be relevant only in the non-commodity sector of the economy, i.e. in the core 
sector (Aoki 2001 and Lenza 2007). This assumption is reasonable because food and energy 
resources are at the most transformed into standardized goods, which are traded in near-
competitive markets with frequent price adjustments. 
Commodity prices change in response to supply or demand shifts. Although the recent 
price hike is to a large extent caused by a booming economy, especially in the emerging 
markets, and therefore demand-driven, from the point of view of the oil-importing 
industrialized countries it represents a supply shift. 
NKMs were developed for business cycle analysis, i.e. shocks are usually modeled as 
stationary. However, the relative increase in energy and commodity inflation may be a more 
permanent phenomenon in view of the soaring demand from emerging markets such as China. 
Since it is not possible to forecast the relative prices for commodities with any accuracy, we 
also analyze the optimal monetary reaction to a permanent shock to commodity price 
inflation. 
In the following, subscript f marks the commodity sector, where fully flexible prices 
prevail. Subscript s labels the remaining part of the model economy which is interpreted as 



























                                                 
3 Svensson (2008: 3) asserts that inflation targeting is in practice always flexible inflation targeting in the sense 
that it aims to stabilize both the real economy and inflation. 
4 As Duval/Vogel (2008: 6) point out, nominal price rigidities do not greatly influence the effects of oil price 
shocks and do not give rise to different economic responses to alternative monetary policy strategies, with one 
exception: If a central bank follows a Taylor rule and focuses on headline inflation, strong nominal price rigidity 
causes monetary tightening and output contraction to be more pronounced. 
  3respectively.  , j t P  and   represent the price level in sector j and the price level of the whole 
economy respectively. The model is loglinearized around a deterministic steady state with 
zero inflation. Since the model is well documented in the literature, we only present linearized 
equations. Loglinearizing the aggregate price index, 
t P
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where γ is the fraction of non-commodity goods in the aggregate consumption basket.
5 
Sectorial output gaps,  , j t y %  are defined as 
(5)  ,,
n
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where   is the natural level of output in the respective sector. Note that even if prices are 
fully flexible in the commodity sector,   is not always zero, because a sub-optimal output 
level in the core sector would automatically imply sub-optimal goods consumption in the 
commodity sector. The aggregate output gap is defined as 
n
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Natural output levels in the respective sectors evolve exogenously, depending on the relative 
price level in the commodity sector.  
Apart from definitions, the equilibrium dynamics of the model economy can be 
summarized by two equations that determine the output gap and core inflation. A new 
Keynesian IS equation, which describes the consumption-saving trade-off, can be derived 
from a standard Euler equation for consumption: 
(7)  () 1, 1
1 n
tt t t t s tt yE y iE r
S
π ++ =− − − %%  
where   represents the nominal interest rate. S is a deep structural parameter of the model 
derived from preferences and the relative importance of the two sectors. Aggregate demand 
positively depends on the expected output gap, 
t i
1 tt y + Ε % , and the difference between the 
expected real interest rate and the natural real interest rate,  . The natural interest rate is the 
interest rate that would prevail in a fully flexible economy. The IS curve states that the 
expected slope of the temporal path of aggregate demand depends, among other things, on the 
expected real interest rate and therefore monetary policy. 
n
t r
A new Keynesian Phillips curve describes the relationship between inflation, expected 
inflation and the output gap in the sticky price sector: 
(8)  ,, 1 s tt s t t E y π βπ κ + =+ %  
                                                 
5 The parameter  γ  is calibrated to 0.9. 
  4where   is a structural parameter that determines the link between output gap and inflation in 
the sticky price sector. Prices are sticky because only a fraction of firms can reset their prices 
in each period (Calvo 1983). The greater the price stickiness in the core sector of the 
economy, the flatter is the Phillips curve. Core inflation depends on expected core inflation 
since firms take into account their forecasts of future real marginal costs when they are able to 
modify their prices. 
κ
In the standard NKM, the structure of the economy, i.e. nominal frictions, serve as a 
constraint of the central bank. The central bank has to identify underlying shocks and use the 
equations that characterize the dynamics in the economy to restore the optimal levels of 
inflation and output. In the two-sector case, the evolution of the relative price of commodities 
must also be taken into account. The relative price of commodities depends positively on 
output and negatively on the natural output in the commodity sector. 
(9)  ( )
n
t f t t f y y c x , , − =  
where   is a structural parameter of the model, corresponding to the preferences of private 
households. Combining this equation with equation (8), the new Keynesian Phillips curve can 
be augmented by relative price changes: 
c
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Equation (10) states that the relative price of commodities enters into the Phillips 
curve and affects inflation in the sticky price sector. The mechanism in the model is the 
substitution between the flexible price good and the sticky price good. When the relative 
commodity price increases, households increase their relative demand for the sticky price 
goods. Facing an increase in demand (relative to supply), sellers in the core sector raise their 
prices. Our calibration assumes that only 25 % of firms are able to change their price in each 
period, i.e. individual prices stay constant for approximately one year. The Taylor rule takes 
on the simplest possible form and assigns deviations from both policy objectives the same 
weight, so generally monetary policy is implemented by an equation of the following form:
6
(11)  ( ) ,, 0.5 0.5 tj t k j t k iy ππ π ++ =+ − + %t . 
Based on this model we examine the effect of different shocks to the commodity price 
level, ranging from a non-permanent increase in the commodity price level to a permanent 
increase in commodity price inflation. As indicated by the specified Taylor rule, the central 
bank has a choice between targeting headline inflation and targeting core inflation. As a 
practical alternative we also consider the possibility that the central bank targets expected 
headline inflation. To illustrate the different effects of these three monetary policy objectives 
every simulation is performed three times: first, using headline inflation,  t π , second, using 
core inflation,  , s t π , and third, using expected headline inflation,  4 t π + . 
                                                 
t
6 Since the model is linearized around zero inflation, the Taylor rule collapses to  , 1.5 0.5 tj t k iy π + = + % . 
  5Figure 1 shows how the interest rate, headline and core inflation, and the output gap 
react to a temporary but persistent oil price shock given the three Taylor rules introduced 
above.
7 The simulations show that stabilizing core inflation is the superior monetary strategy: 
both output in the core sector and core inflation stay close to their optimal values. In a two-
sector model, the central bank should therefore focus on core inflation, not because it is useful 
to predict future inflation, but because by doing so the central bank can reduce market 
distortions in the sticky price sector and achieve an optimal allocation of resources (Mishkin 
2007: 7; Woodford 2003).
8 Furthermore, if core inflation is stabilized perfectly, changes in 
relative prices solely depend on changes in the potential output in both sectors. Demand 
factors do not affect relative prices and relative prices stay at their efficient levels. If the 
central bank instead focuses on headline inflation, the decline in output and nominal wages 
will be greater as will the variability of core inflation. 
The output losses which occur when the central banks targets headline inflation can be 
avoided by focusing instead on one-year-ahead expected inflation. However, the positive 
counter reaction of the output gap does not diminish. As in the case of current headline 
inflation, core inflation is higher when central banks target expected headline inflation given a 
persistent but non-permanent shock: The reason is that inflation in the commodity sector 
becomes negative after the initial impulse and rational agents in the core sector, who know the 
evolution of relative prices, raise their prices more aggressively (Duval/Vogel 2008). Since 
both core inflation and output gap are more volatile, targeting core inflation also prevails over 
expected headline inflation.  
In the simulation with the core-inflation Taylor rule the central bank raises interest 
rates because core inflation increases. The reason is the increase in the relative price of the 
commodity that lowers demand in this sector and raises it in the core sector. Given an oil 
price shock in practice, such a short-term increase in the demand for core goods seems rather 
unlikely because of the low price elasticity of energy demand and the low elasticity of 
substitution between goods in the commodity and the core sector. As a result, demand for 
core goods may actually fall. 
The main results also apply to the case of a permanent shock to the relative price level 
in the commodity sector, because the focus on headline inflation causes core inflation and the 
output gap to fall before returning to its optimal level (Figure 2). If the central bank focuses 
instead on core or expected headline inflation none of these negative reactions occur. 
Nonetheless, expected headline inflation as a target will generate a small increase in interest 
rates, whereas focusing on core inflation leads to a small decrease in interest rates because 
core inflation is expected to fall in response to the negative output gap (because both reactions 
are so small they cannot be seen in Figure 2).  
                                                 
7  , ft x  follows an AR(1) process,  ,, 1 ft ft t x xu ρ − =+ ;  ρ is set to 0.8. 
8 In the simulations, the central bank cannot stabilize both targets perfectly, because monetary policy is 
implemented by a simple feedback rule depending on realized variables.   
  6Figure 1: Responses of nominal variables and the output gap to a persistent increase in commodity prices 
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Figure 2: Responses of nominal variables and the output gap to a permanent increase in commodity prices 
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  7It can be shown that, according to the model, core inflation remains the superior 
monetary target in case of permanent shocks to commodity price inflation. The effects are 
easily understood when one considers a modified new Keynesian Phillips curve in terms of 
headline inflation. 
(12)  () 1, , ,
11 1 n
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In the case of permanent shocks to 
f
t x Δ  equation (10) and equation (12) have a similar shape 
but a different intercept.
9 Since the intercept of the Phillips curve in terms of headline 
inflation is larger when a permanent increase in oil price inflation occurs, output losses are 
bigger if central banks try to keep headline inflation stable. The output losses are the result of 
the permanent trade-off between inflation and output, which can be derived from the new 
Keynesian Phillips curve. Since core inflation must decline permanently if central banks focus 
on headline inflation, it seems to be better to stabilize core inflation in this case as well. 
However, Ascari and Merkl (2008) show that this trade-off stems from the fact that the model 
is linearized around zero inflation in both sectors. If the true, non-linear model is considered, 
the output effect crucially depends on the inflation level around which the model is linearized. 
If inflation in the sticky price sector exceeds a critical level, the effects of permanently 
depressing inflation by focusing on CPI inflation would be positive rather than negative. 
Table 1 summarizes the implications of the standard NKM for the choice of inflation 
indicator. Only one case can be detected where headline inflation is the optimal target for 
monetary policy and that is, if the shock to commodity price inflation is permanent and core 
inflation was initially above its optimal level. Note that the expansionary effects of reducing 
core inflation in this case would also occur without a commodity price shock. It follows that 
focusing on headline inflation is never preferable provided that prior to the shock monetary 
policy was successful in stabilizing core inflation at its low, optimal value. To use Table 1 for 
monetary policy in practice one needs to know the optimal level of inflation in the sticky price 
sector of the economy. Ascari and Merkl (2008) show that the optimal level is very low, 
approximately 0.5 percent. However, in practice measuring inflation involves errors and, for 
several reasons, the measurement error has a positive bias. Therefore, as a reasonable 
assumption, the optimal level of inflation might well be in line with the ECB’s inflationary 
objective of ‘below but close to 2 percent’. 
                                                 
9 Here,  , ft x Δ  follows an AR(1) process,  ,, 1 ft ft t , x xu ρΔ −Δ Δ= Δ +. In the case of a permanent shock to commodity 
price inflation ρΔ is set to 1. 
  8Table 1: Optimal policy objectives 
(ρΔ : shock persistency) 
  s π before shock to  , f t x Δ  
  > optimal level  ≤ optimal level 
ρΔ < 1  s π   s π  
ρΔ = 1  π  
s π  
In a nutshell, the analysis of an energy price shock in the standard new Keynesian 
model yields the following conclusions: A hitherto successful central bank should strive to 
stabilize core inflation. If there is no real wage rigidity, the effect on inflation will be 
temporary whether the initial shock is permanent or not. In the case of a temporary shock, i.e. 
one that is reversed in the near future, a Taylor rule based on actual (rather than forecast) 
headline inflation, will cause output to decline more and inflation to be more unstable than a 
Taylor rule based on core inflation, i.e. the consumer price index excluding energy. An 
inflation-targeting central bank would hardly react to the price shock at all. 
Two extensions  
Next we discuss the two most important extensions of the standard NKM, specifically 
modeling commodities as inputs in production
10 and the assumption of real wage rigidity.  
None of the modifications dramatically change the implications for the optimal monetary 
target. 
The results discussed above do not change qualitatively when commodities are also 
used in production. In case of the standard NKM, more expensive commodity imports lower 
the natural output level in both sectors in a similar manner as adverse technology shocks. 
When the commodity is not only a consumer good but a factor input as well, there are not 
only direct effects on the price level but also indirect effects as the higher production costs 
lead to successive indirect increases in the level of prices. These indirect effects are thought to 
peter out within one year (Fisher/Marshall 2006: 2).  If the output objective is interpreted to 
be the level at fully flexible prices, the central bank can achieve a zero output gap and keep 
core inflation equal to zero by targeting core inflation.  
A different situation arises if there is a high degree of real wage rigidity. In this case, 
the direct and indirect impact of the oil price shock on the price level is amplified by second-
round effects. No matter what monetary policy strategy is followed, the temporary increase in 
inflation will be greater, and the monetary restriction and output decline more pronounced. 
Given real rigidities, the central bank faces a trade-off between output stabilization and 
inflation stabilization (Blanchard/Gali 2008: 4).  
                                                 
10 In Germany, for instance, 70 % of all energy imports are used as inputs in production. 
  9Given a temporary or permanent price level shock, the Taylor rule based on actual 
(rather than expected) headline inflation, would cause output to decline more but headline 
inflation to be more stable than would a Taylor rule based on core inflation. Second-round 
effects would be greater in this case. For an inflation-targeting central bank, the choice of 
inflation target does not greatly affect the outcome because expected inflation is targeted. As 
the central bank does not react to the initial jump in inflation, monetary policy is less 
restrictive than if the Taylor rule is applied. In the case of a temporary shock, targeting future 
core inflation yields more stable inflation (Duval/Vogel 2008: 6). The effects of real wage 
rigidity, i.e. the trade-off central banks are confronted with, are generally larger the lower 
nominal price rigidities. The worst-case scenario for practical monetary policy is therefore an 
economy with highly rigid real wages and highly flexible prices.  
Given a permanent increase in commodity price inflation, central banks must reduce 
core inflation permanently to keep headline inflation stable. As mentioned above, the 
permanent positive trade-off between output and core inflation is an artifact of the linearized 
new Keynesian model. In the true non-linear model the trade-off is only positive if core 
inflation was initially below its optimal level. Ascari and Merkl (2008) show that real wage 
rigidities also aggravate the effects of permanent changes in core inflation. Targeting headline 
inflation is therefore only optimal if core inflation was above its optimal level before the 
permanent shock to commodity price inflation occurred. 
All in all, our simulations show that substantial output losses would occur if central 
banks attempted to stabilize headline inflation when faced with commodity price shocks. A 
focus on headline inflation is only adequate, if there is a permanent change in commodity 
price inflation and the initial level of core inflation was above its optimal level. 
4 Core inflation and expectations 
Central banks aim for low and stable inflation because, firstly, high inflation increases the 
variability of inflation and thereby the uncertainty in economic decisions. Secondly, high 
inflation causes distortions as a result of the non-indexation of taxes and by raising transaction 
costs, for example. Thirdly it leads to arbitrary redistribution, as for instance, between 
borrowers and lenders or owners and renters. 
The goal of monetary policy is to stabilize headline inflation over the medium term. 
Our new Keynesian simulations show that in the event of commodity price shocks monetary 
policy achieves better results when focusing on core inflation. In these models future headline 
and core inflation are known to all economic agents. In practice, focusing on core inflation is 
furthermore an attempt by central banks to discern whether underlying inflation is changing.
11 
So as not to react too strongly to transitory changes in inflation, core inflation can serve as a 
proxy for headline inflation in the short term (Mishkin 2007: 1). Accordingly Blanchard/Gali 
                                                 
11 It is therefore not, as Krugman (2008a) points out, “a nefarious scheme to ignore the real hardships people 
face”. 
  10(2008) without further comment use core inflation in their new Keynesian simulations of the 
monetary policy response to oil price shocks, which rely on the contemporaneous rather than 
the future rate of inflation.  
A key question is how to calculate core inflation. First round effects include not only 
the direct impact on the price level but also the indirect effects as higher commodity costs are 
reflected in other goods and services. The consumption price index excluding energy and food 
can serve as a proxy, but the excluded categories include goods and services that are only 
minimally affected, whereas some of the included ones are greatly affected by the rise in 
commodity prices, such as public transportation.
12
Central banks that emphasize core inflation and underlying inflation in communicating 
with the public may positively affect inflation expectations, thereby aiding the economic 
adjustments subsequent to an exogenous price shock. Expectations play a crucial role in the 
transmission of shocks (and of monetary policy) according to the new Keynesian model.   
Prices are changed at large intervals, so that price setters take expected future inflation into 
account when setting prices. Anchored expectations, i.e. high central bank credibility, should 
also make price-wage spirals less likely. Bean (2005) attributes to anchored expectations the 
fact that inflation expectations remained unchanged despite high increases in the price of oil: 
“…market participants believed that central banks would be able to pursue a more relaxed 
monetary policy in order to offset the adverse demand effects of the oil price increase without 
having to worry about setting in train a wage-price spiral of the sort seen in the 1970s” (Bean 
2005: 12; see also Bean 2008: 6f.).
13
5 How should the ECB react to the price shocks of 
2007/2008? 
A key question the ECB currently faces is whether real wages in the euro area are highly rigid 
or not. So far, there are only very limited signs of a wage price spiral. In some countries, such 
as Italy, wage increases are too high given the rate of productivity increase, but there has not 
been a pickup in the rate of wage increases there. In the euro area as a whole, hourly wage 
costs are increasing at a rate of 2.8% which is well within the bounds of productivity increase 
plus inflation target. There has been an increase in wage rises of late, but this is at least in part 
due to a return to normality in Germany, where nominal wages increases were well below real 
productivity increases for several years. 
If the price shocks currently affecting the euro area were transitory, the policy advice 
would be obvious. The ECB should not react to the increase in inflation, because the effects 
                                                 
12 Mishkin (2007: 8) cites studies that evaluated different measures of core inflation and conclude that none can 
said to be superior per se. 
13 Blanchard raises the question of whether the case for expectations may be overstated in the new Keynesian 
model: “One may reasonably ask, however, whether a price setter, choosing prices for the next month or the next 
quarter, will change his decision depending on what his expectation of inflation is, say, in five years. Put another 
way, while we very much want to believe it, I am not sure we actually understand whether and how anchoring of 
inflation expectations is so important. (Blanchard 2008: 21). 
  11of monetary tightening would be felt when headline inflation has declined below the inflation 
target due to falling oil prices. A policy reaction would in this case increase the variability of 
both inflation and output. But even if the shock is permanent, headline inflation will be 
affected only in the short run provided there are no second-round effects.
14  Although it could 
be argued that monetary restriction is warranted because the increase in the price of oil lowers 
potential output, output itself is lowered by the oil price shock as well, as incomes are lower 
and negative wealth effects emanate from the less favorable terms of trade. 
By explaining why some measure of core inflation is an important indicator in the face 
of commodity price shocks the ECB could try to further stabilize inflation expectations as 
headline inflation temporarily exceeds the target close to but below 2%. The recent increase in 
medium and long run inflation expectations suggests that the ECB was not completely 
successful in communicating these issues to the public. In our view, the lack of 
communication rather than the commodity price shock is the reason for potential problems in 
stabilizing inflation expectations in the euro area.    
As Buiter (2008) rightly points out,
15 inflation is a sustained rise in the price level. 
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